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Statement of the Research Question
The issue to be investigated in this paper involves the
responsibility center concept and the objectives of financial performance
measurement and evaluation. It is speculated that the value of the
responsibility center approach to performance evaluation is limited
because of practical difficulties in application. For this reason, the
responsibility center approach is frequently inappropriate or inadequate
for evaluation of internal organizational performance. It is the objective
of this study to answer the question: Does the responsibility center
concept meet the objectives of financial performance measurement and
evaluation ?
Scope of the Study
Financial performance measurement and evaluation techniques
appear to be based upon the perceived need for corrective and preventative
controls to attain organizational objectives. In response to the issue
concerning the value of performance evaluation, Anthony states:
There seem to be two valid answers to this question. First,
if a person knows in advance that his performance is going to be
1

judged, he tends to act differently from the way he will if he believes
no one is going to check up on him. (Anyone who has received
grades in school should appreciate the importance of this point. )
The second reason why the appraisal of performance is valuable
is that even though it is literally impossible to change an event that
has already happened, an analysis of how well a person has performed
in the past may indicate, both to the person and his supervisor, ways
of obtaining better performance in the future. Corrective action
taken by the person himself is of prime importance; the system
should "help the man help himself. " Action by the superior is also
necessary. Such action may range in severity from giving criticism
or praise or suggesting specific means of improving future
performance, to the extremes of either firing or promoting the
person.
Within the broad area identified in the above statement, budgeting
and accounting are viewed as being facilitative of performance evaluation
in financial terms. This paper is concerned with the objectives of the
budgeting and accounting aspects of performance measurement and
evaluation. For purposes of discussion, these are referred to as
performance accounting objectives.
The responsibility center concept has developed within the field
of managerial accounting as a technique for realizing the objectives of
performance accounting. This concept and the associated principles,
methods, and practices involved with it, constitute the central issue of
this paper.
Purpose and Utility of the Study
Through the process of collecting together a number of
viewpoints, this paper will identify the issues involved in the
Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting Text and Ca ses
(4th ed. ; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 522,

research question. It is expected that conflicts among authorities will
be revealed and that areas where present knowledge is unsubstantiated or
incomplete will be identified.
Research and Analysis Methods Used
Information used in the paper was obtained through search of
literature pertaining to the research area. Various authorities in a
number of related areas have been cited in cases where considered
appropriate.
Facts and opinions bearing on the research question will be
evaluated and interpreted to develop a conclusion that is responsive to
the question. Deductive and inductive reasoning will be applied to the
theories and cases cited.
Organization of the Study
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of
managerial accounting techniques, as manifested in the responsibility
center concept, in meeting the objectives of financial performance and
evaluation. Accounting measurements are financial in nature, yet
performance evaluation is concerned with non-financial as well as
financial factors.
In order to determine the contribution of the responsibility
center concept, the first issue to be investigated will be that of the
objectives of financial measurement and evaluation. This will involve
a preliminary review of the concept of measurement, followed by an

investigation of the purposes of budgeting and accounting with respect
to performance measurement and evaluation.
The second underlying question to be answered concerns the
responsibility center concept. In this regard, the concept will be defined
and associated principles and problems identified in the literature on this
subject will be investigated. More specifically, a variety of proposed
applications and limitations of the responsibility center concept will be
reviewed.
Following these two preliminary considerations, the objectives
of financial performance evaluation will be subjected to research to
determine the specific issues involved. Where appropriate, the issues
identified will be related to the responsibility center concepts and
principles.
Conclusions concerning the value of the responsibility center
concept as a technique for performance evaluation will be drawn from
the results of the examinations described in the foregoing paragraphs.

CHAPTER II
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
AND EVALUATION
Introduction
The search for efficiency, effectiveness and economy in
organizations is pervasive. These qualities are typically the objective
of performance measurement and evaluation. Efficiency is generally
thought of as a ratio showing competency of perforinance with respect to
input and output. Effectiveness implies a concentration on output and
on the capability to produce a desired result. Economy, on the other
hand, is characterized by frugality of inputs. Each of these terms, and
all of them collectively, constitute the broad objective of performance
measurement and evaluation. Because of the close relationship of these
terms, and the difficulty in distinguishing the various shades of meaning
involved, their collective nature will be considered as the generalized
quality with which performance measurement and evaluation are
concerned.
This generalized objective defies measurement and evaluation.
For this reason, systematic procedures are required to simplify these
qualities into elements that are subject to measurement. The concept
and nature of measurement and the difficulties associated with

measurement require investigation before proceeding to the more specific
objectives of budgeting and accounting in performance measurement and
evaluation.
The Nature of Measurement
Measurement pertains to ascertainment of extent or of
dimensions of that which is being measured. Comparison with a standard
is associated with the concept of measurement. Baumol, in a general
discussion of the term measurement, indicates that "a measure, in its
most general sense, is simply a device, which is designed to convey
information about the phenomena to which it refers. " In expanding the
concept, he indicates that the information is typically numerical and
2therefore a "linguistic convention' is required to indicate the meaning
of the measure.
The frequently-used example of measuring temperature is
illustrative of the concept. The terms cold and hot are relative and
imprecise. The context in which these terms are used is important to
understanding. It should be recognized that the terms describe a quality.
The term "70 degrees Fahrenheit" along with the context in which it is
used, gives a more precise meaning to the measurement of temperature.
In this case a quantity is used as a measurement of quantity. Baumol
^William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis





expands the concept of measurement by the use of three classifications
that have varying power to convey information. The first and weakest
index type is associative. This is illustrated by the example in which
faces in ^ photograph are identified by a number shown for each person
in the photograph and a corresponding separate listing of numbers and
names. A second classification uses ranking or ordering on a scale.
This measurement, typified by a hardness index, carries associative
information; but it does more. A more rigidly specified linguistic
convention is therefore required. The ordinal utility measure fits into
this classification. Cardinal measures, the third category, convey more
than either of the former. These measures permit prediction; they are
additive. The predictive feature is illustrated by the example in which
the number of boards four feet long that can be cut from a board twenty-
four feet long can be predicted. It is noted that this measurement can
also be applied to the ranking and to the ordering categories.
The foregoing are meant to be illustrative of conceptual
difficulties associated with the term "measurement. " As pointed out by
Paul Kircher of the University of California at Los Angeles:
Measurement has always been an important factor in providing
information to serve as the basis for solving business problems.
But as management has become more interested in using scientific
tools to aid in making decisions, it has become increasingly evident
that present methods of measurement in the business field frequently
are inadequate. *
•Paul Kircher, "Fundamentals of Measurement, " in Management
Systems, ed. by Peter Schoderbek (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
,
1967), p. 3 61.

8Kircher indicates that while much of the indefinability of business logic
will continue, "nevertheless there are many relationships which can be
measured in business. " Much of the problem of measurement in
business is associated with difficulties in defining objectives. The issue
to be resolved concerns development of objectives that are "susceptible
of some sort of quantification. "
A tentative rationale for measuring proposed by C. West
Churchman is that "the function of measurement is to develop a method
for generating a class of information that will be useful in a wide variety
of problems and situations. " In this context, Churchman sees
measurement as a decision process because of the alternative ways in
which data can be assigned to categories and the ways that numbers are
as signed.
Churchman proposes that a measurement scheme should be
considered with respect to language, specification, standardization, and
accuracy and control. The objectives of the language of measurement
include: communication to a number of potential users; facilitation of
utilization of the information. The conflict in these language goals is
recognized. A decision is required to balance commonality and
1Ibid1
2 Ibid.
^C. West Churchman, "Why Measure?" in Measurement
Definitions and Theories
,
ed. by C. West Churchman and Philburn




complexity; breadth and depth. Increased preciseness limits the
number of users of information. The specification issue applies to the
scope of application with respect to time, place, and items. The degree
of generality is the conflict in this case. The decision is to determine
what objects in what environment apply. To be useful for comparisons,
measurement standards are needed. The standardization decision
requires a balance between the need for a method of minimizing
adjustment required because of differences in time, place, people, etc.
,
and the need to differentiate. The issue is concerned with procedure
versus precision. The procedural aspect of standardization is illustrated
by the practice of using a deflation index to facilitate comparisons of
Gross National Product over time. The construction of suitable
standards is obviously complex and difficult.
The term accuracy in itself involves a measurement. Accuracy
is concerned with the extent to which a measurement deviates from the
"truth. " The long-term aspect of accuracy is control. This means that
measurements require periodic verification of their legitimacy.
These areas of consideration provide a framework for thinking
about measurement activities. A different way of looking at the structure
of the measurement process as it applies to management is to divide the
process into important elements to permit improved clarity of relation-
ships. Elements of the process identified by Paul Kircher include:
1. Determination of the objective of the business entity, the
purpose which is to be served in a particular situation.
2. Determination of the types of factors which might serve
to attain the objective.
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3. Selection of the key aspects of the factors, the aspects
which are to be measured.
4. Choice of (a) a measuring method, (b) a measuring unit.
5. Application of the measuring unit to the object to be
measured- -the central action of measurement.
6. Analysis of the measurement- -relating it to other
measurements (other in time or in kind).
7. Evaluating the effectiveness of the measurement by
determining the extent to which it assisted in the attainment of the
1
objective.
R. W. Shephard expresses concern with "the preoccupation . . .
with methods . . . for manipulating measurements, and, ... by the
small amount of attention that appears to be given to the problems of
2making these measurements. " Although his concern is specifically
identified with operational research, it appears to be pertinent to the
general area of measurement.
Shephard examines measurement in the physical sciences as a
starting place to achieve understanding of what is involved. He defines
measurement "as the assignment of numerals to events or objects
according to rules, and the distinction between various types of scales-
-
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio- -is essentially on the basis of the
mathematical transformations that leave the scale form invariant. " In
addition to the classification by type of scale, Shephard points out that
"measurements may also be classified according to whether they are
Kircher, "Fundamentals of Measurement, " p. 362.
^R. W. Shephard, "An Appraisal of Some of the Problems of
Measurement in Operational Research, " in Management Systems, ed. by









etc. ) or derived (lb. /ft. 3, ft. /sec. ), " or by methods
used to take them. "These methods are either direct, as when an
unknown length is measured by placing a foot rule alongside, or indirect,
as when temperature, for instance, is measured in terms of a column of
mercury. "^
He indicates that "indirect measurement will remain of extreme
importance even if the connecting relationships are not known; the
possibilities of measuring goodwill in terms of orders lost, or morale
in terms of productivity are encouraging even though the causal
connections are elusive. " Shephard also points out the problems of
measurement upon inclusion of the human variable. A single scale of
values fails to represent subjective magnitudes such as utility. The
typical approach to this aspect of measurement appears to be to attempt
development of a scale representative of a population norm against which
deviations can be measured.
Methods of measuring utility and risk have been proposed, but
at the current stage of development, these are somewhat crude.
. . . 4Practical applications appear to be minimal. As pointed out by Baumol ,











developments; however, actual practical employment of the concept is
apparently rare. Vincent R. LoCascio, * of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co. , has proposed an approach for development of a utility function to
portray management's attitudes which is based on an ordered ranking of
one hundred or more graphically represented distributions, from which
it is claimed that a quantitative representation can be developed.
Although this approach may be of theoretical importance, it appears to
be somewhat rough and subject to misrepresentations.
Stafford Beer indicates that measurement depends upon a chain
of comparisons linking the item measured to a standard which "must in
turn be hedged with many qualifications about how it is to be measured,
2
to what accuracy, and in what conditions. " He illustrates the
difficulty encountered in measurement by an example in which six similar,
but not identical, machines have been subjected to an alleged improvement
at the end of period six in Table 1. The objective is to determine whether
or not the change was an improvement. Two measurement approaches
were used to make the determination. It is noted that there are twenty-
six productive and ten unproductive periods both before and after the
change in Table 1.
••Vincent R. LoCascio, "The Cost of Capital in an Uncertain
Universe, " Financial Executive, October, 1970, pp. 70-78.
Stafford Beer, Decision and Control: The Meaning of
Operational Research and Management Cybernetics (London: John




NUMBER OF ITEMS PRODUCED PER PERIOD ON SIX MACHINES'
Periods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Machines
A 572 570 568 nil 574 570 572 nil 570 572 nil 572
B 550 548 nil 552 nil nil 550 554 554 nil 552 550
C 606 698 600 612 nil 609 610 615 nil nil 612 nil
D nil 588 586 588 586 590 nil nil 588 592 nil 590
E 543 nil nil nil 535 550 560 565 558 545 550 548
F 548 546 545 540 nil 542 544 542 546 548 nil 548
v Beer, Decision and Control, p. 71.
Table 2 shows the result of one method of measuring the effect of the
change.
TABLE 2








'Adapted from table in Beer, Decision and Control, p. 12,
This measurement shows that the change was not an improvement.
A second measurement approach, the results of which are shown












'^Adapted from table in Beer, Decision and Control
, p. 12.
Using this approach to measurement, production after the change is
shown to be higher for every machine. The issue to be decided is which
of the methods is relevant- -the one that takes machine differences into
account or the aggregate. It might also be shown that neither is relevant;
that the before and after outputs can be attributed to chance.
An additional simple example that illustrates problems inherent
in measurement is shown in Table 4. The determination as to which
of the proposals is better requires consideration of factors other than
those measured.
Average Average
Before Change After Change
570. 8 571. 5
550. 552.
605. 6 12. 3
587. 6 590.
542. 7 554. 3





Project A Project B
Revenue $1,000 $2,000
Costs - 500 500
Result No. 1 $ 500 $ 800
Result No. 2 50% 40%
The objective of this section has been to examine the nature of
measurement so as to be aware of some of the factors that must be
considered in a measurement scheme. To generalize, measurement
involves quantification; development of surrogates with which to
characterize qualitative elements. Quantitative measures are
advantageous in that they are explicit. By using quantification,
comparisons and conceptualization are facilitated. Quantification
involves the dangers of ritualization, distortion, and incompleteness
with respect to showing the whole element or phenomenon being measured.
The preceding investigation of the nature of measurement and the
difficulties expected to be encountered in measurement systems provides
a frame of reference for the following section which is concerned with
the objectives of performance accounting systeins.
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Performance Budgeting and Accounting Objectives
In order to relieve some of the complexities of managing large
organizations, a need exists for systems that will permit decentralized
decision-making and at the same time facilitate overall centralized
control. This includes the need for concepts of management self-
appraisal at lower levels and for top management evaluation of the
performance of organizational units, output categories and individual
managers. In business organizations, profit measurement and analysis
is generally accepted as an overall index of output efficiency. Among
the important considerations required in using such an index are goal
congruity between the individual and the organization as well as balance
between short- run results and the long-term effects of operations.
Performance evaluation is concerned with organizational units
and output. Performance measurement in financial terms is a function
of cost and management accounting within the broader area of planning,
budgeting, and controlling. It involves classification of costs and
revenues into categories useful for analysis. Performance measurement
and evaluation, viewed as elements of organizational control, are put
into perspective by Rodney E. Schneck in a summary of the process of
control:
1. A desired value or purpose is needed as a standard of
acceptable performance.
2. The collection of data, about actual performance or
behavior. (This is a problem of measurement and information
feedback.
)
3. Comparison and evaluation of this actual performance
against desired standard or criteria are needed.
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4. The undertaking of corrective action if actual performance
is unsatisfactory.
5. Where necessary, changing the desired standard or value
of acceptable performance.
Schneck also elaborates on the role of organizational goals, pointing out
that goals serve three functions.
First, they provide a desired future state which in turn orders
and directs organizational activities and provides criteria for
decision-making. Second, goals serve as standards by which
management and all interested parties can measure effectiveness
and efficiency of the firm's past performance. Third, goals
provide an important source of legitimacy for the firm in the
larger social system. ^
He also explains the complex and continuing process whereby the broad,
ambiguous, abstract and ultimate goals of organizations (survival and
maintenance of existence) are broken down into concrete and operational
goals through factorization, giving consideration to internal and
environmental interactions, influences and constraints. Goal displace-
ment, manifested in the case where operating goals may be "primarily
concerned with preserving the existing organizational structure and
maintaining managerial power rather than efficiently accomplishing the
stated purpose of the firm, "^ or "when strict adherence to rules,
procedures, and regulations become an end in itself, " 4 is seen as a
lRodney E. Schneck, "The Management of Large Corporations, "
in Topics in Managerial Accounting, ed. by L. S. Rosen (Toronto:








hindrance to efficient organizational performance and should be
recognized in performance measurement and evaluation systems.
Recognition of the problems of "priorities, suboptimizations,
inconsistencies, and internal conflict' inherent in goal multiplicity is
also of importance to performance accounting systems.
In a broad sense, budgeting is viewed as a means by which
performance and goals are related. Through classification, analysis,
quantification, integration, and evaluation, improved performance is
thought to be realized. A sampling of various viewpoints (summarized)
with respect to the functions of budgets serves to illustrate the perceived
relationship to performance evaluation.
Sord and Welsch attribute the following functions to budgets:
(1) forecasting conditions, (2) planning to implement goals, (3) estimating
future financial position, (4) controlling expenditures, and (5) appraising
performance. In this view budgets serve to integrate financial planning
by establishing and formalizing profit objectives.
The view put forth by Herman C. Heiser^ identifies budget
functions which include, inter alia, quantitative measuring and reporting
of performance to permit analysis of deviation and translation to terms
1IbicL, p. 26
^Burnard H. Sord and Glenn A. Welsch, Business Budgeting:
A Survey of Management Accounting and Control Practices (New York:
Controllcrship Foundation, Inc. , 1958).
^Herman C. Heiser, Budgeting Principles and Practice (New York
The Ronald Press Company, 1959).
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of profit and loss. Heiser points out that the budget is a financial
representation of non-monetary things.
Charles T. Horngren explains the usefulness of budgets by the
categories of (1) formalization, whereby forced explicitness requires
planning and preparation for change, (2) performance judgment, of
activity and personnel, and (3) integration, through coordination and
communication.
In an approach to budgeting as a plan to guide operations and to
serve as one aspect of performance evaluation, Shillinglaw indicates
that much of the value of budgeting is related to the preparation process,
and through self-examination, forced quantification, anticipation of
situational results, and participation, objectivity is stimulated,
profitability and interorganizational consistency are examined, and
commitment to objectives is realized.
The budget as envisioned by Anthony
is useful: (1) as a device for making and coordinating plans, (2) for
communicating these plans to those who are responsible for carrying
them out, (3) in motivating managers at all levels, and (4) as a
standard with which actual performance subsequently can be
compared.
With respect to performance evaluation and appraisal, it is
Charles T. Horngren, Accounting for Management Control: An
Introduction (2d ed. ; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
,
1970), pp.~188-89.
^Gordon Shillinglaw, Cost Accounting Analysis and Control
(rev. ed. ; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1967), p. 14.
-'Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting, p. 505.
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important to understand the multiplicity of uses of budgets and the
inherent dangers of oversimplification of complex processes and of
accepting surrogates as goals. The intended use of budgets should be
considered along with the individuals concerned and the specific
situation. The following view of Peter F. Drucker with respect to
controls can be applied to the needed awareness of the role of budgeting
in performance measurement and evaluation:
It is, therefore, important today when our capacity to design and to
manipulate controls is increasing so fast, to think through what
controls in a social situation and in a particular business enterprise
have to be and have to do, and also what they cannot be and must
not attempt to do.
A strict distinction of the separate roles of budgeting and accounting
with respect to performance measurement and evaluation is not feasible.
It appears worthwhile, however, to attempt to narrow the field of
consideration. For this reason, the following discussion emphasizes
the role of accounting as it relates to performance measurement and
evaluation.
2Charles T. Horngren views an effective accounting system as
providing information for external reporting, internal reporting for
planning and control, and for making special decisions. Internal
Peter F. Drucker, "Controls, Control and Management," in
Management Controls: New Directions in Basic Research, ed. by
Charles P. Bonini, Robert K. Jacdicke, and Harvey M. Wagner
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 288.
^Charles T. Horngren, "Choosing Accomiting Practices for
Reporting to Management, " in Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting,
ed. by Hector R. Anton and Peter A. Firmin (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 3-20.
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reporting and special decision analyses are the domain of management
accounting. Its objective is management improvement and improved
effectiveness and efficiency. As pointed out by Horngren, "The job of
serving both internal and external demands can be an imposing one.
Citing H. A. Simon, he differentiates the three functions of "score
keeping, " "attention directing, " and "problem solving" and indicates that
2
each should be performed by distinct and separate accountants. The
Simon study cited by Horngren was based on the question: "How should
a company's accounting department be organized in order that the data
it assembles will be of the greatest usefulness to the operating executives
of the business in making decisions and solving problems? The pattern
of accounting organization proposed by Simon includes examples in which
at the factory department level one or more accounting analysts,
thoroughly conversant with operations, who can help department
heads interpret and trace costs through the monthly and other
periodic cost statements exist . At higher levels, on the other
hand, it was suggested that there might be needed a small number
of strategically placed groups of analysts largely occupied with
special studies rather than periodic reports - -analyzing the cost
and savings associated with possible changes in operating methods
and equipment. 4
For purposes of analyzing the functional relationships of performance
accounting and the organization, the foregoing appears to be indicative
1IbicL, p. 4.
2jbid.
, p. 5, citing Administrative Behavior, (2d ed. ), p. 20,
^H. A. Simon, Administra tive Behavior (2d ed. ; New York:





of the requirement to ensure that systems should give consideration to
careful analysis of the needs of individuals and the organization as a
whole.
K. M. S. Wilson* indicates that what is needed in management
accounting are measures to ascertain goal and sub-goal consistency,
sub-goal to sub-goal consistency, and sub-goal to actual performance
consistency. He calls this the need to search for relationships in cost
behavior. Wilson states that the
transition from conventional to control accounting, via cost and
management accounting as evolutionary phases, shifts the emphasis
from rules to hypotheses. . . . Accountants must learn to think in
terms of empirical hypotheses rather than legalistic rules. "^
This approach emphasizes output rather than processes.
Under the subhead of "Guides to Selection of Management
Accounting Practices, "^ Horngren emphasizes that the system should
yield relevant, valid and pertinent, rather than accurate and precise
information. He also states that the principle tasks of management
accounting include directing attention, providing clues, raising pertinent
questions, and inducing desired behavior. Horngren also gives
importance to the principle that standards operate as a norm only to the
extent that they are accepted by those responsible as a fair measure of
1r. M. S. Wilson, "Perspectives in Accounting for Control. "
Management Accounting Journal of the Institute of Cost and Works
Accountants, Vol. 48, No. 8, (August, 1970), pp. 285-94.
2Ibid.
, p. 294.
^Horngren, "Choosing Accounting Practices, " p. 6.
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performance, and to the extent that the items used for measurement are
controllable. 1 This concept, in which participation is seen to be an
important element of performance accounting, appears to be widely
accepted, yet it is subject to controversy. The participative concept is
2typified by McGregor as the approach in which the supervisor enters
the budget process after the subordinate has set his own performance
goal. As a consequence of experimental research, Andrew Stedry
questions "the universal validity of this recommendation, for under the
experimental situation if 'management' decides on a 'high' (performance)
budget, its use of MacGregor's Csic] participation plan coincides with
the worst possible result. On the other hand, it would probably help
performance in a 'low' budget situation. " Stedry's experiment was
concerned with the effect of different aspiration levels on performance
and goals. Becker and Green^ challenge Stedry's conclusion on the
basis of the method used to measure aspiration level, and attribute
success to participative methods through a chain of reasoning involving
the effect of group cohesiveness on production. The controversy
^bid.
, p. 11.
^Douglas McGregor, "An Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal, '
Harvard Business Review, (May-June, 1957), pp. 89-94.
•^Andrew C. Stedry, Budget Control and Cost Behavior (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I960), p. 91.
^Selwyn Becker and David Green, Jr. , "Budgeting and Employee




continues. It appears that performance accounting (measurement and
evaluation) does have performance motivation among its objectives, yet
the operatives in this area remain subject to further research. As
Birnberg and Nath point out, "the Becker-Green hypothesis was based
upon various laboratory and field studies. It has not yet been tested in
the managerial accounting context. A similar comment could be
made with respect to Stedry's conclusion. His experiment was a
laboratory study involving sums under ten dollars, therefore raising the
issue of non-transferrability to larger sums because of utility disparities,
In a discussion of a system using standards and variances,
Myron L. Gordon indicates that for a system of accurate performance
measurement "a set of procedures for classifying the transactions of the
firm must be specified and incorporated in the system which eliminates
from the supervisor's variance account the variances due to factors
beyond his control. " He concludes, however, that a system of
standards and variances is an aid to judgment which can be used with
ISee Andrew C. Stedry, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior:
A Reply, " and Selwyn W. Becker and David Green, Jr. , "Budgeting and
Employee Behavior: A Rejoinder to a Reply, " Journal of Business
,
Vol. 37, No. 2, (April, 1964), pp. 195-202 and 203-05.
^Jacob G. Birnberg and Raghu Nath, "Implications of Behavioral
Science for Managerial Accounting, " in Accounting and Its Beha vi oral
Implications, ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T. DeCoster
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 10.
%yron L. Gordon, "Cost Allocations and the Design of
Accounting Systems for Control, " in Contemporary Issue s in Cost
Accounting, ed. by Hector R. Anton and Peter A. Firmin (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 183.
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analysis in performance evaluation. The accounting system function
is to put transactions into categories "which allow the speedy selection
of the relevant data for each problem. "
With regard to operations research and audit functions,
Robert W. Trueblood believes that "accountants must be prepared to
consult on the design of these new information systems and to counsel
on the changes in operations methods as they will effect the audit
function. " In a more general sense, then, if accounting is to serve
management for measurement and evaluation purposes, it appears that
these functions must be integrated with developing operational methods.
Summary
The objectives of performance measurement and evaluation are
as broad as those of management in general. Performance measurement
and evaluation systems are seen as facilitative to management, and
therefore the primary objective is that they should be tailored to ensure
appropriateness to the individuals involved and to the prevailing
environment and situation. The following summary, although relatively
general in nature, covers the main concepts and views investigated in
this chapter.
Measurement is a complex process involving a multitude of
1Ibid
1 , p. 184.
^Robert M. Trueblood, "Operations Research- -A Challenge to
Accounting, " in Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting, ed. by




of difficulties and dangers. It involves quantification and development
of surrogates with which to characterize qualitative phenomena in such
a way as to facilitate conceptualization and comparison.
Performance measurement and evaluation are concerned wiih
efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; with success in accomplishment
of goals. Within the broad areas of planning, budgeting and controlling,
performance measurement and evaluation are generally considered to be
identified as being among the functions of cost and management accounting
The objectives of performance measurement and evaluation include:
1. Provision of a basis for forecasting and planning; for
setting operative organizational and individual goals to serve as
standards or criteria for evaluation of activities and personnel.
2. Integration of the goals of the organization and the
individual members of the organization. This is frequently purported
to be a function of the degree of participation in setting goals.
Performance measurement and evaluation assumes that measured
phenomena are controllable. Goal to goal congruity is seen to be
improved by recognizing and utilizing the research applicable to
motivational aspects of perforinance measurement and evaluation and
the behavioral implications of accounting.
3. Communication of timely, relevant, valid, and pertinent
information for special decisions and problem solving, including results




The objective of a performance measurement accounting
system is to simplify complexity, to act as an aid to judgment. The
system itself should be subject to contimiing appraisal to determine
whether or not it contributes to management and whether or not
managers are making use of the system.

CHAPTER III
THE RESPONSIBILITY CENTER CONCEPT
Introduction
Performance evaluation in financial terms is frequently
associated with the economic theory which "asserts that the objective of
the firm is to maximize net revenue in the face of given prices and a
technological determined production function. This assertion as to
the primacy of the profit goal has been the subject of much debate.
The use of financial terms in performance measurement and evaluation
is not limited to organizations participating in an economical environment
in which resources are allocated through a price system under conditions
of perfect competition. Schemes in which monetary terms are used as
a common denominator to facilitate relating inputs and outputs, allocating
resources, and establishing goals have been applied to organizations for
which financial profit is neither a primary nor a secondary goal. Aaron
Wildansky characterizes a budget "as a series of goals with price tags
'Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavior al Th e ory of
the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1963, p. 5.
^For a concise summary of several viewpoints concerning goals







attached. ... a mechanism for making choices among alternative
expenditures. By application of this concept, it follows that
financial measurements can be of value in performance evaluation
situations where financial profit is not appropriate as an index of
effectiveness and efficiency.
In this chapter some of the methods used to apply financial
performance measurement will be investigated. For this purpose the
concept of the responsibility center as described by Anthony
,
Horngren^,
and others will be used as a basis for the review.
Responsibility Centers
In describing responsibility centers as subdivisions of a larger
organization, Anthony points out that each has inputs and outputs.
Measurement of the inputs and outputs in terms of quantity and quality is
facilitated by using the common denominator of money; however, total
recorded transactions may be an approximation of inputs /outputs because
of excessive effort required to translate into monetary terms or because
measurement is not feasible. In monetary terms inputs are classified
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 2.
^Robert N. Anthony, "Note on Responsibility Centers, " in
Management Control Systems Cases and Readings, ed. by Robert N.
Anthony, John Dearden, and Richard F. Vancil (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 165-71.
•^Charles T. Horngren, Accounting for Management Control
,
pp. 324-41.
^Anthony, "Note on Responsibility Centers. "
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as costs or expenses; outputs, as income or revenues. Profit is the
difference between output and input.
Anthony! classifies responsibility centers into the categories
of expense centers, financial performance centers, and investment
centers. "In an expense center, inputs are measured in monetary
terms . . . but no attempt is made to measure output in monetary terms
2
or to relate inputs to outputs in monetary terms. A financial
performance center (a broadening of the concept of a profit center in
business) can be applied to profit-seeking organizations or to non-profit
organizations. "In this type of responsibility center, both inputs and
outputs are measured in monetary terms, and the relationship between
them is calculated. " The broader concept of an investment center is
characterized by measurement of "profit related to the assets employed."
In an investment center or a financial performance center,
profit is seen to be indicative of effectiveness and efficiency subject to
limitations with respect to inappropriateness of money as an indicator of
input/output, inaccuracy of standards, and short- run/long- run conflicts.
Cost relationships and comparisons are used as the means of measuring
performance in an expense center.
1
Ibid







Cost or expense is the basis for expense center performance
evaluation in monetary terms. There are a variety of ways of looking
at costs. Cost classifications appear to be among the most important
considerations in expense center performance systems. Stafford Beer,
in an article urging adoption of operational research techniques in
development of cost standards, considers the problem of cost groupings
as a major issue. He speculates "that for one reason or another,
notably perhaps for the ultimate reason that policy makers just cannot
assimilate thousands of detailed results into either their own minds or
their managerial decisions, cost groups must be a feature of accountancy."^
Generally, costs are broadly classified by objects (inputs of labor,
material, services), products or programs (outputs of material or
services), and activities (responsibility centers). This breakdown
involves a three-dimensional way of looking at costs. Each of these
categories can be further subdivided into several subdivisions. One
subdivision within the activity category that is important to responsibility
accounting is the distinction between controllable and uncontrollable
costs. "Controllable costs are those which may be directly regulated
^Stafford Beer, "Operational Research and Accounting, " in
Studies in Cost Analysis, ed. by David Solomons (2d ed. ; Homewood,




at a given level of managerial authority. "* In practice, it is often
difficult to resolve the distinction between controllable and uncontrollable
costs. Keller and Ferrara point out that "there is a responsibility 'slot'
for each and every cost element. "^
This point is illustrated by Horngren with respect to the time
dimension of controllable costs and the controllability of a long-term
lease, in which he indicates that "over the long run, top management
must determine the commitments which are reflected in such accounts
as rent, depreciation, and property taxes. "^
The distinction between controllable and non-controllable costs
applies to a particular responsibility center and implies that the amount
is "significantly influenced by the actions of the manager of that
responsibility center. "
Another way of looking at costs for purposes of performance
evaluation involves a normative concept as opposed to actual costs.
Systems of accumulating costs can be "divided into two broad classes:
5historical costs and predetermined costs. " The distinction is between
^Horngren, Accounting for Management Control
, p. 328.
^1. Wayne Keller and William L. Ferrara, Management
Accounting for Profit Control (2d ed. ; New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1966), p. 247.
-'Horngren, Accounting for Management Control, p. 328.
^Anthony, Management Accounting, p. 469.
5john J. W. Neuner, Cost Accounting Principles and Practice
(4th eel.; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 461.
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the use of actual costs and predetermined standard costs as a basis for
application to product or cost center. Typically, complete standard
cost systems employ flexible budgets and are designed to permit
analysis of variances with respect to price, quantity, volume,
efficiency and mix. Under standard cost systems "variance accounts
are inserted in the system at whatever point the shift from actual to
standard is made.
For purposes of assigning costs to products a distinction
between direct costs and indirect costs is made. "Direct costs are
those that are specifically traceable to or caused by the manufacture of
a product or the carrying out of a program. " "Indirect, or overhead,
costs are those costs not associated directly with the products worked
on; including all manufacturing costs other than those classified as
direct material and direct labor. In contrasting direct costs with
controllable costs, Anthony points out that "all controllable costs are
direct since by definition an allocated cost is not controllable, but not
5
all direct costs are controllable. " Direct costs that may not be
•Harold Bierman, Jr. , Topics in Cost Acc ounting and Decisions
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), pp. 9-13.










controllable cited by Anthony include depreciation and rental charges.
Under the previous definition, these charges appear to fit into the category
of indirect costs. For purposes of contrasting direct/indirect costs with
controllability, it seems that direct costs would generally be considered
as controllable and that indirect costs could be either uncontrollable or
controllable.
Discussions of costs also distinguish fixed, semi- variable, and
variable as a way of establishing relationships. "Variable costs are
those which are expected to fluctuate, in total, directly in proportion to
sales, production volume, or other measure of activity. " Fixed costs
are those which are not expected to change in total within the current
budget year, regardless of fluctuations in the volume of activity. "
Horngren identifies semi- variable costs as "mixed costs", indicating
that they are "a blend of two unlike cost behavior patterns. "-> Anthony
prefers the term "non- variable" costs rather than "fixed" costs because
of the implication that "fixed" costs are not subject to change. He points
out that non-variable "costs are incurred with the passage of time, and
1IbicL







"Anthony, Management Accounting, p. 452.
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are independent of the level of activity within a time period. " When
coupled with revenue information, this approach leads to cost- volume-
profit analysis using breakeven charts or profit-graphs, and contribution
2
or marginal income approach to performance evaluation. Direct
costing has as its basic characteristic "the segregation of expenses into
fixed and variable components. " From the point of view of an expense
center, variable costs and controllable costs are not synonymous.
Anthony classifies expense center costs into categories of engineered
costs (e. g. , direct labor or direct material), committed costs (e. g. ,
depreciation), and managed costs (e. g. , research, public relations or
legal). Within broad limits, establishment of standards for managed
costs requires considerable judgment. Different approaches to control
apply to each of these categories. Engineered costs are based on
specifications, which permits setting reasonably reliable standards.
1Ibid1
^Ibid.
, pp. 461-67, and Horngren, Accounting for Management
Control, pp. 245-47.
^John R. E. Parker, "Perspectives on Direct Costing, " in
Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting, ed. by Hector R. Anton and
Peter A. Firmin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 167.
^Anthony, Management Accounting, pp. 470-71.
Anthony, "Note on Responsibility Centers, " p. 170.
^Robert N. Anthony, "Notes on Managed Costs," in Management
Control Systems Cases and Readings, ed. by Robert N. Anthony, John
Dearden, and Richard F. Vancil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 172-75.
'Anthony, Management Accounting, pp. 473-76.
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Managed costs, also called discretionary costs or programmed costs,
are not subject to such uniform acceptability of what is correct.
Committed costs result from previously-made commitments. Furlong
and Robertson identify this concept by the term "domino costs," and
indicate that these costs have a tendency toward constancy over several
periods. They point out two dangers inherent in "domino costs". The
first is that the tendency toward constancy over time leads to the
conclusion that these costs are not subject to management control and
2
the "tendency to . . . restrict future alternative courses of action.". In
addition, because of the nature of these committed costs, current
period costs are to some extent the result of past actions and, therefore,
are not indicative of present performance. Newman and Brunell, J in
developing a proposal related to the concept of committed costs, urge
expansion of the time frame for evaluating the impact of costs. It
appears that the nature of committed costs and managed costs with respect
to time are important aspects of performance evaluation.
Classification of costs into functional categories (how the cost
was used: e. g. , manufacturing, selling, or administration) is one more
^-William L. Furlong and Leon H. Robertson, "Matching
Management Decisions and Results, " in Topics in Managerial Accounting ,




^Louis E. Newman and Sidney Brunell, "Different Dollars, " in
Stvidies in Cost Analysis, ed. by David Solomons (2d ed. ; Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 148-57.
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way of looking at cost relationships, according to Bierman. Horngren
indicates that a useful classification for allocation of costs may be by
use of the categories of "(1) operating (line) departments and (2) service
(staff) departments. "^ In expanding this approach, Horngren cautions
that functional costing attempts often "involve flimsy assumptions




Variable time periods are typically not considered as a way of
classifying costs. Time periods are traditionally assumed as a given.
Even so, a time period classification must be chosen, even if by default.
Nichols and Grawoig discuss "the possibility of using some basis other
than time in the reporting of accounting data by allowing the tiine factor
to be variable and holding some other factor constant. "'* Reports
developed on the basis of a fixed amount of sales rather than on a fixed
time period would reverse the fixed/variable cost relationship. Their
proposal would not eliminate reports by time period but would supplement
them. The idea of periodicity on the basis of something other than time
emphasizes the importance of thinking about time with respect to costs.
•^Harold Bierman, Jr.
,
Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions,
p. 5.




^Arthur C. Nichols and Dennis E. Grawoig, "Accounting Reports
with Time as a Variable, " in Topics in Managerial Accounting, ed. by




In the preceding paragraphs, a number of ways of looking at
cost behavior relationships have been mentioned. These general ways
of looking at cost relationships included:
1. Activity or Responsibility Center.
2. Product.
3. Object Classification.
4. Controllable/Noncontrollable (by responsibility center).
5. Actual (historical)/Standard (predetermined).
6. Non-variable (time related)/ Variable (volume related).
7. Direct/Indirect (product).




These classifications are not mutually exclusive nor are they all-inclusive.
Characteristically, overlap among the categories provides for multi-
dimensional analysis and facilitates using a single data set for more
than a single purpose.
As pointed out in a research paper published by the N. A. (C. ) A. ,
cost uses, cost classifications, and cost behavior were found to be "so
interwoven that they were the warp and weft of the same fabric. " The
report also states: "Costs are used for a variety of purposes, and the
1N. A. (C. ) A. , "The Uses and Classification of Costs, " in
Studies in Cost Behavior, ed. by David Solomons (2d ed. ; Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 105.
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same cost data cannot serve all purposes equally well. Essential
uses of cost data are classified in the study as "(a) Determination of
periodic profit, including inventory valuation; (b) Budgetary planning;
(c) Cost control; (d) Pricing policy; (e) Current application of plans and
->
policies. "^
Performance evaluation is a sub-category of cost control. For
this purpose, the concept of an expense center, by definition, requires
classification of costs by activity. In addition, the breakdown of costs
into controllable and noncontrollable elements is stressed with respect
to expense centers. This classification, although fairly easy to
conceptualize, is difficult to realize in actual practice. A third
important consideration for purposes of performance measurement and
evaluation is the system involving comparison of actual costs and
standard costs, which includes analysis of variances. The distinctions
among engineered costs, managed costs, and committed costs also
deserve consideration with respect to performance measurement and
evaluation.
Considering only these four important categories, the
difficulties involved in using monetary terms as a measure of performance
evaluation becomes apparent. In practice, cost systems are rarely






effort involved. This is seen as adding complexity to systems of
financial performance measurement and evaluation.
Profit Centers
In addition to costs, financial performance evaluation of profit
centers or financial performance centers takes revenue into consideration.
The difference between revenues and costs is the focus of measurement.
One definition establishes the following criteria for the
existence of profit centers:
1. It must have two or more units for which separable
measures of revenue and expense are obtained.
2. The management of these units must have considerable
control over the unit's expense and revenue. (Presumably,
authority to influence profit must accompany any true responsibility
for the size of the profit. )
3. Each unit's profit must be calculated and reported
regularly to top management as a part of the unit's performance.
Characteristics of profit centers cited by Joel Dean-' include operational
independence, access to sources and markets, separable costs and
revenues, and management intent. To have operational independence,
a "manager must have a large measure of control over most, if not all,
operational decisions that affect his profits. This includes "determining
Anthony, 'Note on Responsibility Centers," p. 167.
John J. Mauriel and Robert N. Anthony, "Misevaluation of
Investment Center Performance, " Control Series Part III: Reprints from
Harvard Business Review, March-April 1966, p. 11.
3 Joel Dean, "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing, ti
Decentralized Management Series: Reprints from Harvard Business




the volume of production, methods of operation, product mix, and so
forth, subject only to broad policy discretion from top management. "
Dean indicates that the profit center manager "must be genuinely free
to buy and sell in alternative markets both outside the company and
2inside. " "The required access to sources and markets cannot be
created by edict; outside sources or markets must either be there or
3be capable of creation. " The requirement for separable costs and
revenues permits establishment of an "economically realistic price of
end products" and "eliminates service-type staff activities from
consideration. " Under the heading of management intent, Dean specifies
that "only if the basic goal is profits should the operation be treated as
a profit center. " This final point is emphasized by Dean in an example
v/herein a legal department could be operated as a profit center, but
because the profit motive does not control decisions, it should not. In
marginal cases, such as a steel production operation for an equipment
manufacturer, the profit center concept involves the difficulties of price
negotiation but leads to beneficial allocation and recognition of the value









The normative profit center criteria proposed by Dean appear
to be more restrictive than those established by Mauriel and Anthony.
Both views recognize the profit center as a means of relieving the
complexity of large organizations through establishment of some degree
of economic independence. Anthony recognizes the problem of output
pricing but apparently believes that it can frequently be overcome. He
states that "with some ingenuity, practically any expense center could
conceivably be turned into a profit center, because some way of pricing
its output can usually be found. " He, too, agrees that "when top
management requires responsibility centers to use a certain service
(e.g., internal auditing), the service probably should be furnished at no
4
charge, and the service unit, therefore, should not be a profit center. "
Both Dean and Anthony recognize the potential detrimental effects of
conflict that can arise if competitive aspects receive excessive emphasis.
Shillinglaw indicates that "the need for measuring the profit of subordinate
executives arises wherever management responsibility is decentralized-
-
that is, delegated to semi-autonomous profit centers." He delineates
AMauriel and Anthony, "Misevaluation of Investment Center
Performance, " p. 11.
^Anthony, Management Accounting, p. 428.
3 I_bicL, p. 429.
4Ibid.
^Gordon Shillinglaw, "Guides to Internal Profit Measurement,
Decentralized Management Series: Reprints from Harvard Business
Review, March-April 1957, p. 67.
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four important purposes of internal profit reports:
1. As a guide to current operating or "tactical" decisions.
2. As a basis for evaluating managerial performance.
3. As a basis for profit trend and variance analysis.
4. As a starting point for long range investment decisions.
He distinguishes reports into the categories of "routine by-products of
normal accounting procedure"^ and special reports, specifying that the
routine periodic reports are characteristically used for product line
pricing and emphasis decisions and for evaluation of divisional manage-
ment. "These applications are immediate and short range; for
questions of this sort the time horizons are relatively short."
The objectives of setting up an internal profit system proposed
by Joel Dean "are, first the guidance of the division or other internal
managements whose results are being measured, and, second, the
assistance of top management and its staff in their tasks of appraising
and guiding divisional performance. " He observes that there is a
tendency to follow conventional financial accounting principles in
developing internal financial statements and urges recognition of the
differences between external and internal statement uses and restrictions




^Joel Dean, "An Approach to Internal Profit Measurement, " in
Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting, ed. by Hector R. Anton and
Peter A. Firmin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 281.
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exclusively for insiders who may be presumed to be intelligent, informed
and able to follow up or supplement these reports through personal
investigation or staff work. " In preparing statements of internal
profits, consideration should not exclude such concepts as unrealized
profits, inventory gains and losses, gains or losses because of price
level changes, and so forth. Dean doubts "whether any routine divisional
net profit computation along traditional full-cost lines can ever mean
anything useful to either the divisions or top management. "
With respect to the specific function of financial performance
appraisal, Dean emphasizes that the objective is to obtain the advantages
of a small firm and to:
1. Associate responsibility and control.
2. Increase flexibility of profit center management.
3. Stress competitive instead of political skills.
He cautions that profit centers are not, in fact, small independent
companies and that joint costs of the entire organization will be applicable
to more than one division. In this regard, he discourages allocations
of many of these joint costs, indicating that "they are not pertinent for
the purpose of the profit center's decisions, and their impact on
evaluation of the center is too complex to try to summarize by mere
4
allocation. "









Several issues appear to dominate discussion of profit center
operations. The question of control over expenses and revenues can be
subdivided into two problem areas. These are output pricing and cost
allocation. With respect to cost allocation, the difficulties are similar
to those previously investigated under expense centers. The second
element of the controllability issue, output pricing, involves systems and
policies for establishment of transfer prices. A related issue is that
of the usefulness of the profit center (financial performance center)
concept in appraising entities when profit maximization is not the basis
of evaluation.
Solomons points out that "whenever transactions between
divisions make up more than a negligible proportion of the total
transaction, it is obvious that the division's relative profitability can
be very much affected by the formulae used for pricing interdivisional
business. "* He indicates that a high degree of interdivisional
relationships raises doubts as to the usefulness of the profit center
concept because of increased dependence upon arbitrary systems of
transfer pricing. In cautioning against adopting an artificial profit
center system which can be made to give the appearance of working
through an arbitrarily adopted transfer pricing system, Solomons states
"that nothing is to be achieved by a system of ficticious profit
*David Solomons, Divisional Performance Measur ement and




. . . which cannot be achieved without it. ul The problems
of transfer pricing have received considerable attention. Three basic
approaches to establishing interdepartmental prices explained by
Howard C. Greer are "(1) cost, (2) market, (3) negotiation. "^ Joel Dean
classifies transfer pricing systems in more detail. He proposes that
different methods of transfer price determination are competitive pricing,
published market prices, marginal costs, full cos t-plus, sales-minus,
and traditional prices.
Dean and Greer are in general agreement that "the choice
depends both on the kinds of information that are available and the
objectives that the management control system hopes to accomplish
through the system. " "Each must be judged: first in terms of the
mechanics of its application; and second, in terms of its usefulness for
purposes of (a) performance evaluation, (b) investment planning, and
(c) managerial motivation. " In cases where an outside market exists
for a product, the going market price characteristically is proposed as
the favored internal transfer price. Solomons indicates that use of the
1Ibid
1 , p. 164.
^Howard C. Greer, "Divisional Profit Calculation- -Notes on the
'Transfer Price' Problem, " in Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting,
ed. by Hector R. Anton and Peter A. Firmin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1966), p. 290.
^Joel Dean, "Intracompany Pricing, " pp. 108-11.
4Ibid.
, p. 108.
5 Greer, "Notes on the 'Transfer Price' Problem, " p. 290.
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market price, where readily ascertainable, provides a mechanism for
attaining transfers at the company-wide optimum of incremental costs.
Because of the relationship between the two, market price does not
conflict with the incremental cost concept. Horngren asserts that
"market price is the most desirable transfer price because it getierally
leads to the right decisions and it also provides a basis for judging
performance that harmonizes with the profit center concept. "^ Practical
considerations often interfere with adoption of a market price system.
Frequently, market prices are unavailable or unreliable. They are
often subject to manipulation or to erratic movements.
Dean favors competitive prices, established by arm's length
negotiation and freedom to deal outside the company, indicating that such
prices "provide sound guidance in making purchasing decisions, indicate
the extent to which additional processing will be profitable, and direct
the flow of products so as to make the greatest net profit for the
company. He also asserts that the "process of negotiation avoids
arbitrariness and tends to create agreement." Greer disagrees with
the negotiated basis, stating that "the trouble with this appealing
alternative is that it diverts the efforts of key personnel from activities
^Solomons, Divisional Performance, pp. 171-74, p. 199, and
pp. 212-28.
^Horngren, Accounting for Management Control, p. 373.




promoting company welfare, to those affecting divisional results only. "
He further asserts that such a system may also lead to misstatement
because of acceptance by one department or division of high or low prices
from which "top management may derive a completely false impression
as to managerial performance and profit opportunities. "
Cost-based systems, including marginal cost or full-cost
systems, have the advantage of "integrity, understanding and
convenience." Disadvantages of cost- based methods include the
tendency to push costs to the final processing and selling center as well
as the lack of motivation for effecting cost savings. Greer indicates
that the weakness of the cost "method is its almost complete lack of
utility in the fields of evaluation, planning, and motivation. " Dean
points out that the cost-plus method is arbitrary and authoritarian, thus
"it provides a poor basis for evaluating division performance, it beclouds
5profits, and it inevitably diverts production into uneconomic channels.
The sales-minus system mentioned by Dean" is a reversal of
the cost-plus method and is therefore subject to similar disadvantages.
Starting with the final selling price, allowances are subtracted to
"provide for the costs and profits of intervening operations."'
Dean characterizes the traditional price method as "a weird
*Greer, "Notes on the 'Transfer Price' Problem, " p. 292.
2 Ibid.
, p. 293. 3 Ibid. , p. 290. 4Ibid. , p. 291.




throwback to medieval times when the concept of a 'just' price
prevailed. n Under this method the transfer price bears no relationship
to costs or to the market. It is simply an arbitrary, consistent,
convenient method of establishing a price. It appears to offer little in
the way of solving the transfer price problem.
Greer concludes that the transfer price "problem is inherently
insoluble. ' He recognizes that there is value in profit center operations
and, therefore, does not recommend abandonment of placing a value on
output through transfer price systems. "The preferable course would
seem to be: (a) let judgments on profitableness be made, and imple-
mented, exclusively by top management (with aid from experts in analysis
and interpretation); (b) develop other criteria for evaluating and
3
motivating divisional management performance." He considers a
partial solution in which
(a) the producing unit is credited with cost (plus) or market,
whichever is higher, and (b) the receiving unit is charged with cost
(plus) or market, whichever is lower. The difference (if
determinable) is then identifiable as the cost to the company of
compelling two divisions to do business with each other, instead
of utilizing independent outlets or sources.
It appears that utilizing the profit center concept for performance
evaluation is subject to the cost allocation difficulties of expense centers,
compounded by the difficulties inherent in transfer prices. The issue
llbid.
, p. 111.
2 Greer, "Notes on the 'Transfer Price' Problem, " p. 293.
3 Ibid.
, p. 294. 4Ibid.
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to be resolved is whether or not the advantages of pricing output, so that
a monetary unit can serve as the common denominator for input, output,
and residual (performance), outweigh the disadvantages connected with
cost allocation and pricing. Greer corcludes that the following should
be considered in developing a profit center system:
1. Data most useful for motivation purposes are commonly
least suited for pragmatic analysis and realistic forecasting, and
vice versa (e. g. , sales quotas established as goals for selling
achievements are seldom acceptable as the foundation of dependable
production or financial budgets).
2. Conclusions and decisions stemming from reports on
"results" should be reached only by those well- schooled in the
correct interpretation of the figures and responsible for the results
of the business as a whole (not just one of its parts). *
Investment Centers
As previously noted, expense centers concentrate on costs,
while profit centers focus on costs related to revenues. Investment
centers go one step further in simulating small business independence
and flexibility for internal divisions and departments. The performance
result of investment centers is the difference between revenues and costs
related to the investment (assets or capital). Typically, the results are
expressed as a percentage return on investment (ROI) or as residual
income (RI) after deducting a charge for the assets or capital employed.
The approach is viewed as being an improvement over the return on
sales and the budgeted standard profit approaches in that ROI is alleged





by all aspects of the business, (2) measure effectiveness of using assets
to generate profit, (3) provide for automatic investment evaluation, and
(4) provide a common denominator for comparison with other
organizations. The major problem encountered in the ROI approach,
in addition to cost allocation and transfer pricing problems, involves
investment (asset) evaluation and allocation. The residual income ap-
proach discussed by Solomons and Dearden^ appears to be an attempt
to integrate concepts applicable to budgeted standard profits, the ROI,
and the discounted present value approach to investment decision making.
This concept measures in terms of an absolute profit residual after
deducting a charge for the investment involved. The principal
advantages attributed to the residual income approach include the
practicability of using different rates of return for different assets, and
the convenience of straightforward evaluation of the same type of asset
in different divisions. Solomons contends that "the most suitable income
figure for use in appraising the performance of divisional management,
and also for use by divisional executives in guiding their decisions, is
controllable residual income before taxes, as shown in Table 5. "To
guide top management in its decisions relating to a division, the most
4
appropriate figure seems to be net residual income. " The link between
••Solomons, Divisional Performance.
2 John Dearden, "The Case Against ROI Control, " Harvard
Business Review, May-June 1969, pp. 125-35.




A FORM OF DIVISIONAL INCOME STATEMENT*
Sales to outside customers
Transfers to other divisions at market value
Variable charges to other divisions for transfers
not priced at market value
Less:
Variable costs of goods sold and transferred
Variable divisional expenses
Variable Profit
Add (deduct): Fixed charges made to (by) other




Depreciation on controllable fixed assets
Property taxes and insurance on controllable
fixed assets
Controllable operating profit
Add (deduct): Nonoperating gains and losses
Less: Interest on controllable investment
Controllable residual income before taxes
Less:
Noncontrollable divisional overhead
Incremental central expenses chargeable to
division
Interest on noncontrollable investment
Net residual income after taxes
Less: Taxes on income



























'''Solomons, Divisional Performance, p. 82.
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performance evaluation and controllability, discussed under expense
centers and profit centers, also applies to investment centers.
Shillinglaw indicates that of several profit concepts, "none is superior
for all purposes. " He nevertheless favors controllable profit as the
most appropriate for evaluating executive performance.
Henderson and Dearden express dissatisfaction with the ROI
concept characteristic of investment center performance evaluation:
ROI is a fraction, with annual net profit as the numerator and
investment as the denominator. Both of these figures are so
arbitrary that it is difficult to justify them as a measure of
performance. ^
The issues identified in their discussion include the problems associated
with allocation of costs to time periods, capitalization versus expense
treatment of expenditures, and the arbitrariness of the investment size
used for evaluation. In addition to the cost allocation and output pricing
problems of profit centers, a peculiar problem of asset allocation is
encountered. Horngren points out that "the same difficulties that plague
allocation of costs to departments beset allocations of assets to profit
centers. Investment centers also appear to be subject to the
controversies associated with conventional financial accounting principles,
such as periodicity, inventory valuation, and depreciation methods.
^Shillinglaw, "Guides to Internal Profit Measurements," p. 72.
^Bruce D. Henderson and John Dearden, "New System for




, September-October, 1966, p. 14.
^Horngren, Accounting for Management Control, p. 369.
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In a survey conducted by Mauriel and Anthony, it was found that
"generally accepted accounting principles, including any internal company
rules and procedures intended to govern the reporting to outsiders of
financial data on the firm as a whole, tend to influence very strongly
the methods used in calculating the investment base." "Unfortunately,
these principles may cause distortions in divisional ROI or residual
income measures. "
If investment centers are to be useful in performance evaluation,
reports separating controllable from noncontrollable costs, revenues, and
assets appear to be appropriate. In addition, there appears to be general
agreement that procedures should be "based on the needs of an internal
performance evaluation system rather than on the needs of an external
reporting system. "-*
Summary
Internal financial measurements applicable to performance
evaluation are established by using responsibility centers chosen on the
basis of a division, department, or some other organizational unit for
which responsibility can be identified. Depending on the financial data
used for evaluation, responsibility centers are classified as expense
centers (costs), profit centers (revenue less costs), or investment centers
(revenue less costs in relation to investment).
^Mauriel and Anthony, "Misevaluation of Investment Center
Performance, " p. 11.
2Ibid.
, p. 19. 3 Ibid.
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Controllability of financial elements (cost, revenues and assets)
used for measurement and evaluation is viewed as essential to performance
evaluation usefulness. In addition, importance is given to the idea that
all concerned should understand the various relationships and that the
system adopted should be developed to fit the situation. In this regard,
the various ways of classifying costs and the purposes of the various
classifications should be subject to considerable attention. With respect
to revenues, the advantages and disadvantages of different transfer pricing
methods should be recognized. The tendency to implement the investment
center concept of internal performance measurement by using financial
accounting principles and practices may result in inappropriate decisions.
The problems and difficulties of measuring and evaluating
perfonnance in financial terms are ubiquitous. Despite these difficulties,
the responsibility center concept appears to be popular. The next chapter




PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTING ISSUES AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY CENTER CONCEPT
Introduction
As previously discussed, financial performance measurement
and evaluation techniques are viewed as tools of management that are
intended to simplify complexities that would otherwise be imponderable.
An investigation of the nature and purpose of financial performance
measurement and evaluation led to a summarization of several viewpoints
into three main objectives. This summary indicated that a system of
financial performance measurement and evaluation should facilitate:
1. Establishment of performance criteria.
2. Goal congruence between the organization and individuals.
3. Communication of relevant information.
The responsibility center concept is viewed as a means of
implementing financial performance measurement and evaluation. Under
this concept the focus of performance measurement is on costs in expense
centers, on profit in profit centers, and on profit related to capital in
investment centers. Some of the recognized problems inherent in
responsibility centers include cost categories and uses, cost allocation,




potential for inappropriate evaluations associated with the influence of
financial accounting principles on internal systems.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the issues of
.financial performance measurement and evaluation related to the
responsibility center concept. Areas of conflict and expected dysfunctional
consequences associated with the responsibility center concept and
financial performance measurement and evaluation objectives will also
be investigated.
Establishment of Performance Criteria
In order to measure and to evaluate, a standard is required.
One of the objectives of financial performance measurement and evaluation
is to facilitate setting organizational goals to serve as a standard or as a
criterion for evaluation. Characteristically, profit is assumed to be the
primary goal of a firm or an organization. Keller and Ferrara indicate
that "budgetary planning and control has the ultimate objective of attaining
the optimum profit."* In a subsequent discussion, the foregoing is
tempered to some extent, as illustrated by the statement that "the basic
underlying consideration in budgeting is constructing a plan of action
.2
which is designed to achieve an acceptable return on capital employed. "
The distinction between "optimum profit" and "acceptable return" may be
a matter of semantics. Profit goal primacy, however, is clearly






emphasized. In addition, Keller and Ferrara state that "the budgetary-
process can be effectively used in measuring and controlling the general
financial performance of the firm and the financial performance of the
individual divisions of the firm. " In lesponse to the question of
organizational objectives, Horngren accepts the tenet that "profit is
2generally recognized as the prime objective," but recognizes the other
objectives and the danger of "overemphasis of the rate of return on assets
as a measure of efficiency. "^ Anthony indicates that "the control process
is facilitated when objectives of the organization are clear-cut, but in most
organizations objectives are by no means clear. " "" He states that the
business objective of profit "is both too simple and too vague . . . because
corporations usually have more than one objective . . . £andj. . . because
for effective control one needs to know the strategies that the top
management has chosen: the products it has decided to manufacture, the
scale and location of manufacturing activities, the markets in which the
products are to be sold, the method of reaching these markets, the
5
organizational structure, the sources of financing, and so on. "
The issues reflected in the foregoing are: (1) whether or not
profit is the prime objective of a business organization, and (2) whether
1Ibid1 , p. 410.
^Horngren, Accounting for Management Control, p. 292,
3 Ibicl.
, p. 293.





or not a single measure, in financial terms (costs, revenues, and /or
profits), is a suitable standard with which to measure and evaluate
internal performance with respect to organizational goals.
Charnes and Stedry indicate that the "implicit recognition of
the existence of multiple goal structures possessed by individuals in
organizations and organizations themselves is far from new. In
developing a theory concerning the nature of organizational goals, Cyert
and March point out a problem:
1. People (i.e., individuals) have goals; collectives of people
do not.
2. To define a theory of organizational decision making, we
seem to need something analogous- -at the organizational level- -to
individual goals at the individual level.
They view the business organization as "a coalition of individuals, some
3
of them organized into subcoalitions, " including "managers, workers,
stockholders, suppliers, customers, lawyers, tax collectors, regulatory
agencies, ect. " In other types of organizations, and over a period of
time, coalition member s and boundaries are subject to change but can
generally be identified by major classification. "Basic to the idea of a
coalition is the expectation that the individual participants in the
'Abraham Charnes and Andrew Stedry, "Investigations in the
Theory of Multiple Budgeted Goals, " in Management Controls: New
Directions in Basic Research, ed. by Charles P. Bonini, Robert K.
Jaedicke, and Harvey M. Wagner (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1964), p. 186.
^Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
, p. 26.
3 Ibid.
, p. 27 4Ibid.
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organization may have substantially different preference orderings
(i. e.
,
individual goals). " Organizational goals, as developed through the
coalition approach are viewed as "a series of more or less independent
constraints imposed on the organization through a process of bargaining
among potential coalition members and elaborated over time in response
to short-run pressures. " Cyert and March reach the conclusion that
"five major goals: production, inventory, sales, market share, and
profit"-^ sufficiently represent the contemporary business firm. The
production goal consists of the two elements of smoothing and output level.
"It reflects pressures toward such things as stable employment, ease of
scheduling, development of acceptable cost performance, and growth.
Avoidance of runouts and convenience of a source of material are the
predominant pressures with regard to the inventory goal. In order for
the organization to survive, the sales goal and the market share goal are
imposed. "In addition, the market share goal is linked to . . . the de-
mands of . . . comparative success . . . and . . . growth. "-> The profit
goal is based on "(1) demands for accumulating resources in order to
distribute them in the form of capital investments, dividends to stock-
holders, payment to creditors, or increased budgets to subunits; (2) de-
mands on the part of top management for favorable performance measures.'
The foregoing citations have applied to "the dimensions of goals (what
things are viewed as important). " ' Cyert and March indicate that
ilbich 2 Ibid.
, p. 43. 3 Ibid. 4Ibid. , p. 41.
5Ibid.
, p. 42. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. , p. 115.
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"aspiration level on any particular goal dimension is influenced by . . .
essentially three variables: the organization's past goals, the
organization's past performance, and the past performance of other
'comparabie' organizations.'
A proponent of the primacy of the profit goal, Joel Dean, states:
A business firm is an organization designed to make profits, and
profits are the primary measure of its success. Social criteria of
business performance usually relate to quality of product, rate of
progress, and behavior of prices., But these are tests of the
desirability of the whole profit system. Within that system, profits
are the acid test of the individual firm's performance.
Dean recognizes that "profit maximization has become extensively qualified'^
because of imperfect competition, which permits operation on the basis of
standard or reasonable profit. With respect to the conflicting goals of
individuals concerned with the firm's profit, he develops four criteria that
could be used to set the standard:
1. What it takes to attract outside capital.
2. What earnings are needed to finance the firm's development
solely from retained profits (plus depreciation).
3. What the company or comparable firms have normally
earned.
4. What the man in the street thinks is "reasonable profit. "'*
Dean further contends that "different standards should be used for different
purposes, since no one criterion of profits is acceptable to everyone who
is interested in them. " He concludes, after a discussion of problems
hbid.
^Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:











inherent in the responsibility center concept, that "these complications
don't rule out the use of divisional profit accounting for control purposes,
but they mean that profit standards must be set largely by managerial
ukase, designed with discretion and wisdom. " Solomons defends the
role of financial performance goals, in particular "the excess of net
earnings over the cost of capital" and "the long-run counterpart of this
objective . . . maximization of the discounted present value of the
enterprise. " He indicates that this objective is all inclusive "because
everything that happens to a business, or to any segment of it, affects
present value. " Because of the difficulties in responsibility accounting,
profit results are "imperfect approximations" which "leave plenty of
room for other measures of performance . . . particularly . . . the
performance of a segment of a business such as a division. " The
General Electric Company is cited as an example of a firm that supplements
financial performance with non-financial measures. Various measure-
-i
ments and judgment are applied to the "key result areas" of profitability,
productivity, market position, product leadership, personnel development,








i, Divisional Per formance,
3 Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6 Ibid.
^Ibid.
, p. 284. This appears to be similar to the result areas
proposed by Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York:
Harper ck Brothers Publishers, 1954).
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It appears that primacy of the profit goal remains subject to
controversy. In each of the above-cited viewpoints, profits--and by
implication financial criteria in general- -are considered important.
This leads to the practice of setting financial standards for responsibility
centers.
There appears to be broad agreement that an organization is
subject to multiple goals, but that profits or financial goals ultimately
reflect the entire goal structure. The question of whether or not a single
measure, in financial terms, is a suitable standard with which to measure
and evaluate performance remains. This question applies to the criteria
problem and will also be covered to some extent under the heading of
communicating relevant information.
With respect to "yardsticks which company management may
utilize in judging its performance, " Heckert and Willson indicate that
profitability and growth ratios may be utilized for the total business.
They also indicate that "these same . . . tests may be effectively applied
2
to individual segments of the business, such as divisions, yet they
caution that "mere figures cannot tell the entire story, and those who use
3them should be aware of their limitations. " "Concisely stated, it is
important that the figures be properly interpreted and that they be
lj
. Brooks Heckert and James D. Willson, Controllership
(2d ed. ; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963), p. 36.
2 Ibid.
, p. 37, 3Ibid.
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regarded as measures of financial performance and not the entire gamut
of the management field. "-1
V. F. Ridgway cites several studies in which "the inadequacy
of a single measure of performance is evident. " He recognizes that
quantitative measures are useful, but cautions that "indiscriminate use
and undue confidence and reliance in them . . . may result in side effects
3and reactions outweighing the benefits. " One of the problems in using
standard costs as a criterion for performance is the "typical reaction of
operating executives ... to seek explanations and justifications" and to
expend energy resolving the appropriateness of the change resulting in no
reduction of the company's overall costs. This aspect of organizational
goals overlaps with the area of goal congruence.
The rejection of profitability as a measure of performance in the
Soviet Union is cited as evidence of its inadequacy. -> Ridgway also
considers the multiple criteria approach typified by Drucker" which is
ilbicL
^V. F. Ridgway, "Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance
Measurements, " in Topics in Managerial Accounting, ed. by L. S. Rosen
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1970), p. 259.
3 Ibid.
, p. 256. 4Ibid. , p. 258.
^Ibid.
,
citing David Granick, Mana gement of the Industrial Firm
in the U. S. S. R. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management.
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"intended to focus attention on the many facets of a particular job. " This
approach forces increased reliance on judgment. With respect to
balancing these multiple objectives, Ridgway cites the use of a composite
criteria which employs a weighted combination of "the measures of the
various sub-goals into a composite score for over-all performance. "
Because of value conflicts and other difficulties, he concludes that the use
of composite measures, which appears to be a device for combining
several aspects of performance into a broader single criterion, "may
have adverse consequences for the over-all performance of the
3
organization. "
Responsibility accounting, with its focus on financial
measurements, appears to be a reasonably appropriate means of
facilitating the measurement and evaluation of an organization's financial
goals. If the view is taken that profits or financial performance ultimately
reflect the multiple goals of organizations, then the responsibility
accounting concept is particularly useful as a method of developing a
single criterion for performance. The view that an organization is
subject to multiple conflicting goals which require resolution through
judgmental balance tends to de-emphasize the importance of the
responsibility center concept with its single financial criterion for
performance measurement and evaluation. For that matter, it appears








that any single standard, even when developed as a weighted composite of
multiple criteria, is subject to dysfunctional consequences. The strict
responsibility center concept, which relies on financial measurements
for performance evaluation, appears to be subject to deficiencies witn
respect to facilitating development of standards in situations that depend
upon a balance of multiple goals for long-term effectiveness.
Goal Congruence
The objective of integrating organizational goals and individual
member goals is related to the criteria problem. Individual goal
multiplicity and the concept that organizations are subject to multiple
goals are similar concepts. The issue of organizational goals was
treated briefly in the foregoing section of this chapter. With respect to
an individual's goals, several popular concepts appear to be based upon
the views of Maslow, in which "classifications of motivations must be
based upon goals rather than upon instigating drives or motivated
behavior." According to Maslow's theory:
1. There are at least five sets of goals, which we may call
basic needs. These are briefly physiological safety, love, esteem,
and self-actualization. . . .
2. These basic goals are related to each other, being arranged
in a hierarchy of prepotency. This means that the most prepotent
goal will monopolize consciousness and will tend of itself to organize
the recruitment of the various capacities of the organism. The less
prepotent needs are minimized, even forgotten or denied. . . .
*A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation, " in Managerial
Marketing: Perspectives and Viewpoints, ed. by Eugene J. Kelley and




Thus man is a perpetually wanting animal. Ordinarily the
satisfaction of these wants is not altogether mutually exclusive, but
only tends to be. The average member of our society is most
often partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied in all of his
wants.
. . . There are not only ordinary multiple motivations
for usual behavior, but in addition many determinants other than
motives.
3. Any thwarting or possibility of thwarting these basic
human goals, or danger to the defenses which protect them, or to
the conditions upon which they rest, is considered to be a
psychological threat. ...
Integration of these individual goals with organizational goals is
a task of considerable magnitude. Recognizing that an organization is
"a coalition of individuals, some of them organized into subcoalitions
,
and limiting the concept of the organization so that the concern is with
the internal structure only, the objective of goal congruence appears to be
that of reducing conflicts among the various management levels and the
internal departments.
Responsibility accounting emphasizes the responsibility of a
supervisor for his department or division. Argyris contends that "if
everyone does his utmost to make certain that his own department is
functioning correctly, but at the same time pays no attention to the
3functioning of his department in relation to others, trouble will . . . arise."
He indicates that interviews with supervisors in situations where financial
measures are used in evaluating performance "left little doubt that they
hbid.
, pp. 130-31.
Cyert and March, "A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, " p. 27.
^Chris Argyris, "Human Problems with Budgets, " in S tudies in
Cost Analysis, ed. by David Solomons (2d ed. ; Homewood, Illinois:
Richard dT Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 417-18.
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were department centered in outlook rather than plant-centered. "
Argyris contends that "participation in making budgets' should result in
acceptance and therefore in goal congruence, and that "training in human
relations"^ should also be beneficial with respect to the use of financial
performance evaluation. Apparently, participation is seen as the method
by which the individual goal of self-actualization is induced to become
operative. The way in which participation helps to alleviate the problem
of a department centered versus a total organization outlook is not clear,
but it appears to be through free discussion "in defining the steps by which
. . .
goals will be accomplished, i.4
Drucker's system of "management by objectives" appears to
be applicable to goal congruence. The concept involves the setting of
objectives derived from specified over-all organizational goals, based upon
agreement between superior and subordinate levels of the hierarchy.
Because of the involvement, an increased commitment to attain these
objectives is seen to develop.
Rensis Likert develops a similar hypothesis in which he contends
that "supportive behavior and group decision making contribute to
coordination, " indicating that "evidence is available which demonstrates
ijbid.
, p. 477. 2 Ibid. , p. 482.
3 Ibid.
, p. 483. 4Ibid.
•'Drucker, The Practice of Management, pp. 121-28.
"Rensis Likert, The Human Organization: Its Management and
Value (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 67.
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the value of a tightly knit, synergistic organization in achieving high
levels of performance. "
As previously indicated in Chapter II, Stedry has questioned
the value of this participative concept in responsibility accounting. He
contends that the individual's level of aspiration is a critical determinant
of performance and that it might be independent of participation.
Harold J. Leavitt questions the participative concept and
proposes the view of "large organizations as differentiated sets of
"3
subsystems rather than as unified wholes.' He contends that this view
recognizes "that many sub parts of the organization may perform many
different kinds of tasks, and therefore may call for many different kinds
of managerial practices. " 4
According to Harry Eevinson, the process of management by
objectives and performance appraisal are closely related and are, among
other things, intended "to measure and judge performance, " and "to
1Ibid
1 , p. 70.
^Stedry, Budget Control and Cost Behavior, p. 91.
^Harold J. Leavitt, "Unhuman Organizations," in Readings in
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, ed. by L. L. Cummings




-'Harry Levinson, "Management by Whose Objectives?"




relate individual performance to organizational goals. " He contends that
management by objectives (financial or some other measurable factor)
typically does not consider the manager's personal objectives, changes
in his needb over time, and the relevance of organizational goals to these
wants, stating that, "management by objectives and performance appraisal
processes, as typically practiced, are inherently self-defeating over the
long run because they are based on reward-punishment psychology that
serves to intensify the pressure on the individual while really giving him
a very limited choice of objectives. " Levinson concludes that in a
climate that takes advantage of group appraisals and other similar concepts
which fit the general classification of participative management, "work
relationships would then become dynamic networks for both personal and
organizational achievements.' One advantage expected "from such
arrangements is that problems would more likely be solved spontaneously
at the lowest possible levels. "
Levinson's final conclusion, coupled with Stedry's findings and
the results of a series of job enrichment studies which included changes
involving broader financial discretionary controls and responsibility,




-\Stedry, Budget Contr ol and Cost Behavior.
"William J. Paul, Jr. , Keith B. Robertson, and Frederick
Herzberg, "Job Enrichment Pays Off, " Motivation Series: Reprints from
Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1969.
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involves a single financial goal for a broad area of operation, contributes
to integration of individual goals and organizational objectives because of
the increased discretion as to the method of operation of the mix of
resources used to achieve the goal. Pressure to achieve financial results
perceived as unfair may result in conflict and dysfunctional consequences.
With respect to the participative concept, the value appears to
be associated with shared information that helps the responsibility center
manager to evaluate his operation and alternative actions as related to
other responsibility centers and to the entire organizational system.
Participation may be instrumental in raising the manager's aspiration level.
The issue of controllability of costs and revenues used for
performance measurement and evaluation appears to be associated with
integration of individual goals and organizational objectives. Participation
(vertical and horizontal interactions) appears to be important in develop-
ment of equitable transfer prices, cost allocations, and asset allocations.
Communication of Relevant Information
The third major objective of financial performance measurement
is that of facilitating communication of relevant, valid, pertinent
information to decision makers. This objective is among the central
concerns of any measurement scheme. The issue of relevance is related
to questions involving the appropriateness of a single measure discussed
previously in connection with the criteria problem. It applies to financial
accounting as well as to the performance measurement and evaluation
aspects of managerial accounting.
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With respect to performance accounting and the responsibility
center concept, the objective is to determine whether reported costs,
revenues, and assets provide relevant information or misleading
information for evaluation of performance. It is frequently alleged that
typical accounting reports do not give adequate consideration to operations
research techniques and the results of human behavior research. For
this reason, it is expected that reports will not provide relevant information.
Communication of relevant information is related to the science
of cybernetics. Norbert Wiener, who coined this term, indicates that
"effective behavior must be informed by some sort of feedback process,
telling it whether it has equalled its goal or fallen short. "
Stafford Beer points out that
Before cybernetics, most of scientific work done on the subject of
'control had concerned relatively simple systems in isolated
circumstances. Or, if the systems being considered were not
really characterized by either of these properties, they were
treated as if they were.
Beer contends that economic, social and industrial systems are extremely
complex and tend to have viable characteristics (growth, self- reproduction,
and adaptiveness) which permit survival. He identifies three attributes
of a viable system: "its innate complexity, its complexity of interaction
with the environment, and its complexity of internal connectivity. " These
'Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (2d ed. ;
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1954), pp. 58-59.
^Beer, Decision and Control, p. 255.
3ibid.
, p. 256. 4Ibid. , p. 257.
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are "so important that to override them and to treat the system through
a simplified, isolated or incomplete model, places a definite and
measurable limit on the knowledge of that system that can be obtained. "*
Beer also points out that "just as in the search for comprehension of
complex systems the tendency has been to conceive of them too simply,
2
so has there been a tendency to conceive of thein deterministically. "
The general objective of communicating relevant information
appears to be that of providing a means to cope with complexity and
uncertainty. The need is for a reporting scheme or a model that provides
information from which a reasonable approximation of the "real world"
can be made.
Baladouni approaches the relevancy issue by viewing accountancy
"as an integrated system of communication. " He identifies three
problems that the accountant faces with respect to a given purpose for
communicating. These are "selection of events, observation of events,
and production of statements about events. " Conceding that the decision
concerning which events to observe should be determined by the user of
the statement produced, he points out that "it is not a simple matter to
know with complete assurance that all relevant events for a particular
purpose have been perceived, since perception is possible only when the
1IbicL 2 lbid.
, p. 258.
^Vahe Baladouni, "The Accounting Perspective Re-examined," in
Accounting and Its Behavioral Implications, ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. ,





accountant carries the appropriate concepts for identifying relevant
accounting events. " He suggests "that at present we do not possess
sufficient concepts for identifying relevant accounting events and that we
.need to develop new ones and/or to refine present concepts to create
2
sub-concepts, and so on. "
Vatter identifies human traits characterized as "the search for
•3
the simple answer, and the reverence for mathematics" which may result
in misleading cost figures "if they are computed to fit one purpose and
used for another purpose. " He classifies four broad categories of
different situations which involve different considerations:
1. Measuring income.
2. Control of cost incurrence.
3. Overall planning.
4. Decision making in specific situations.
Of these, the second appears to be applicable to performance measurement
and evaluation in that it is viewed as serving "the managerial objective of
placing responsibility for the incurrence of cost. " In this respect "costs
must be related to things being done, and this is largely a matter of
setting costs against decisions. " ' Vatter cautions that "in the patterns
of cost incurrence that are associated with given activities, care must be
xIbid. 2 Ibid.
^William J. Vatter, "Tailor-Making Cost Data for Specific Uses, "
in Topics in Managerial Accounting, ed. by L. S. Rosen (Toronto: McGraw-









taken to remove the effect of variables which have no direct connection
with the activity being costecl. " He cites price level changes among the
variables that require adjustment if cost reports are to be useful. It
appears that this concept should also apply to income variations and asset
valuations in responsibility center accounting. Vatter concludes that
"the responsibility of the cost accountant is to learn the uses that are to be
made of his cost data, and to make certain that the data are used as they
should be, and to see that relevant and irrelevant data are handled
properly, so that management may rely on the figures for what they
purport to be--bases for decision. "
A review of some recent experiments and proposed techniques
that have been directed toward the objective of relevancy will serve to
illustrate some of the emerging concepts applicable to this area.
Rensis Likert points out the absence of consideration given to
3
the "current value of the human organization and of customer good will"
"for each profit center and for the entire corporation" and proposes
"human asset accounting" and recognition of the present value of good
will "in every financial statement. " He contends that "the cold hard
facts of accurate measurements will wipe out many of the erroneous
1Ibid 1 , p. 101.
2Ibid.
, p. 110.








concepts which are widely held today but which are based on incomplete
and short-run financial analysis of only a portion of the firm's assets. "
A joint effort involving the University of Michigan Institute of
Social Research and the R. G. Barry Corporation of Columbus, Ohio, is
directed toward the goal of developing a human resource accounting
2system.
Michael H. Gilbert-^ of Ernst & Ernst also treats the human
asset issue and cites several methods that have been proposed for
developing an appropriate value. He recognizes the "strong theoretical
argument for giving asset status to human resources" and contends that
the concept would be an improvement. However, he points out the
potential for detrimental effect on employees that might result from
establishing a dollar value as an indication of the worth of an individual.
In an experiment designed to test the hypothesis that working
capital flow is the concern in decision making rather than net income,
1Ibid1 , p. 154.
^R. Lee Brummet, Eric G. Flamholtz and William C. Pyle,
"Human Resources Accounting: A Tool to Increase Managerial
Effectiveness," in Topics in Managerial Accounting, ed. by L. S. Rosen
(Toronto: The McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1970), reprinted
from Management Accounting (August, 1969), pp. 12-15; and "Human
Resource Measurement- -A Challenge for Accountants, " Accounting and
Its Behavioral Implications , ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T.
DeCoster (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), reprinted
from The Accounting Review (April, 1968), pp. 217-24.
^Michael H. Gilbert, "The Asset Value of the Human Organization,"





Abdellatif Khemakhem reports that there is some substantiation for the
hypothesis that "a manager often can utilize funds data more than income
data. nl Along this same line, Hector R. Antoir reports an experimental
•model of the firm in which conventional structures were disregarded
during preliminary stages of development. "The accounting model
developed is a funds flow model, or more specifically, a cash-flow model"^
which is being used for further experiments concerned with relevance of
information.
With regard to asset valuation methods, Dyckman concludes
that the results of a simulation, involving students and the effects of LIFO
versus FIFO inventory valuation, indicate that accounting reports may be
relatively less important than assumed. He found concern with cash
availability and market- share rather than profits was evident. In a
•^Abdellatif Khemakhem, MA Simulation of Management-Decision
Behavior: 'Funds' and Income, " in Accounting and Its Behavioral
Implications, ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T. DeCoster
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 230.
Hector R. Anton, "Activity Analysis of the Firm: A Theoretical
Approach to Accounting (Systems) Development," in Contemporary Issues
in Cost Accounting, ed. by Hector R. Anton and Peter A. Firmin (Boston:




^Thomas R. Dyckman, "The Effects of Alternative Accounting
Techniques on Certain Management Decisions, " in Accounting and Its
Behavioral Implications, ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T.
DeCoster (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 211-20.
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similar experiment, Bruns tentatively concludes "that the particular
method did not affect the decisions. "
Rosen and Schneck^ recognize several areas applicable to the
relevance issue in a review concerned with human resources accounting,
performance appraisal research and information overload. They
recommend "closer working relations between accountants and behavioral
scientists," and "the extended use of systems concepts and systems
analysis in accounting.
The foregoing examples of the relevancy problem are not
meant to be all conclusive. They simply illustrate the broad scope of
difficulties involved in communicating relevant information. With respect
to relevance and the responsibility center concept, Myron Gordon has
identified a key point:
The accounting system is one matrix which provides classifications
of data for all purposes. Since the resources allowed the accountant
are limited, using the system to develop one type of classification
limits the resources available for alternatives. Also refinements
in one basis of classification frequently make it extremely difficult
to develop understandable data on any other basis.
^William J. Bruns, Jr., "Inventory Valuation and Management
Decisions, " in Accounting and Its Behavioral Implications, ed. by
William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T. DeCoster (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1969), p. 209.
2l. S. Rosen and R. E. Schneck, "Some Behavioral Consequences
of Accounting Measurement Systems, " in Accounting and Its Behavioral
Implications, ed. by William J. Bruns, Jr. , and Don T. DeCoster
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 173-80.
3Ibid.
, p. 179. 4Ibid. , p. 180.
^Myron Gordon, "Cost Allocations, " p. 178.
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He further points out that "the rigid adherence to rules in classifying
transactions makes the data objective, but also introduces assumptions in
the data which are not valid for every problem in which the data are used. "
Because of this, it becomes especially difficult to determine the data
appropriate for a particular situation or use. Understanding of the
information, if developed from complicated rules, would require extensive
technical training. For this reason there appears to be merit in simplicity,
in developing a system that can be understood with a minimum of technical
expertise.
The responsibility center concept appears to be a means of
improving the communication of relevant information. It goes a step
beyond product costing and results in a meaningful matrix that appears to
be of general use to management in making performance evaluations.
There remain a number of shortcomings in determining what is relevant.
As pointed out by Netten, "most managers find it extremely difficult to
pinpoint just what figures they want, how often they want them, and the
format. " It is speculated that many managers, and accountants, would
be hard pressed to specify explicitly how they integrate various reports to
reach final conclusions. It is expected that techniques developed in
behavioral science and systems research may contribute to improved
1Ibid
1 , p. 184.
^E. W. Netten, "Responsibility Accounting for Better
Management, " in Contemporary Issues in Cost Accounting, ed. by
Hector R. Anton and Peter A. Firmin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1966), p. 195.
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practices with respect to relevancy of information applicable to the
responsibility center concept and performance measurement. The
problems identified with the responsibility center concept that apply to
the relevancy issue appear to include all of those previously specified
(i.e., controllability, allocation of costs and assets, transfer prices,
influence of financial principles, and so forth. )
Summary
Three major objectives of performance measurement and
evaluation which had been previously identified- -(1) criteria establishment,
(2) goal congruence, and (3) communication of relevant information- -were
used as the framework for this chapter. In each case the issues related
to the problems associated with the responsibility center concept were
investigated. It is noted that each of the areas appears to be interrelated
and that the principles and practices proposed under the responsibility
center concept (i.e., cost allocations, transfer prices, financial
accounting influence, etc., also involve interrelationships.
The issues under the category of criteria establishment are
concerned with the primacy of the profit goal as opposed to goal multiplicity
and the suitability of a single financial measurement as reflective of an
organizational criterion. If the financial goal is accepted as an
organizational goal, the responsibility center concept appears to be an
appropriate technique for financial performance evaluation. The evidence
seems to support the contention that organizations arc subject to goal
multiplicity, leading to conflicts between the responsibility center concept
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and the objective of facilitating establishment of organizational criteria
for purposes of measurement and evaluation.
Subject to the problems of controllability of costs and revenues,
the responsibility center concept appears to be suited to facilitating goal
congruence because of discretion as to resource utilization associated
with the responsibility center approach which involves a single measure
of performance.
Communicating relevant information involves the issues of
single measure suitability, and internal relationships among responsibility
centers. Complexity and uncertainty are suffered at the price of using
the same data for multiple purposes. By implementing the responsibility
center concept as one of several ways of developing information while
simultaneously adopting techniques developed through systems analysis
and behavioral science research, relevancy is improved. Because of the
difficulties in determining what is relevant for purposes of performance
measurement and evaluation, reports of results under the responsibility
center concept appear to be subject to deficiencies, and therefore
supplemental information is required. There is evidence to support
reporting in terms of cash flows, simplified rather than complex systems,
measurement of the value of the human elements of the organization, and
other similar departures from the traditional concept of costs and profits.
There are frequent admonitions to consider the systems approach in
developing relevancy of information. The responsibility center concept
appears to be compatible with the objective of facilitating communication
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of relevant information for purposes of performance evaluation, but it
does not completely substitute for more detailed analysis of several





The general nature of measurement forms a basis for
understanding the issues involved in performance accounting. Difficulties
are associated with the use of surrogates which characterize qualitative
elements in measurement systems.
Performance accounting systems, which form a part of the
management process of control, are concerned with organizational goals,
individual goals, relevancy, and relationships among these areas. Each
of these areas appears to be subject to a number of controversies with
respect to proposed treatment.
Under the responsibility center concept, financial performance
evaluation is accomplished by comparisons that are made on the basis of
aggregates expressed in financial terms. In expense centers costs are
collected and classified to form a basis for these comparisons. Problems
arise principally because of the many approaches that have been proposed
to deal with cost classifications and relationships. The profit center
involves the added complexity introduced because of the necessity to




result in conflicts among responsibility centers involved. The investment
center is characterized by the additional dimension of asset (or investinent)
assignments and controversies associated with valuation, allocation, and
•short- run versus long-run results. Some authorities indicate that the
disadvantages of the responsibility center are outweighed by the advantages
of performance evaluation simplicity and objectivity as well as the
additional discretion allowed to responsibility center managers with respect
to resource allocation in achievement of over-all results. Much of the
responsibility center controversy can be traced to questions involving the
primacy of profit as an organizational goal, the suitability of a single
measure of performance, integration of individual and organizational needs,
and the relevancy of information chosen to represent performance.
Measurement
Measurement involves quantification and development of arbitrary
rules. Acceptance of the rules can be based upon conscious rational
consideration or simply upon tradition, habit, or unspecified assumptions.
With respect to the subject of this paper, an understanding of the nature of
measurement appears to be important to the extent that it permits
consideration of what is being measured and what is not being measured.
Criteria Establishment
Performance evaluation requires establishment of a standard to
serve as a basis for comparisons. The principal issue associated with
establishment of criteria appears to be the conflict between those that
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espouse the economic theory point of view that profit is the primary-
indicator of organizational effectiveness and those committed to the concept
that an organization is subject to goal multiplicity.
Economic theorists appear to recognize a need for different
standards of profit for different purposes. The appropriate standard for
performance evaluation appears subject to considerable judgment. For
this reason, the approach that supplements the profit goal as an indicator
of organizational performance with multiple criteria is believed to merit
consideration.
Cyert and March have developed a rigorous argument in support
of the goal multiplicity concept which includes profit as one of several
performance areas. This appears to lend credibility to the approach that
proposes the use of multiple goal criteria for performance evaluation.
The responsibility center concept calls for establishment of
financial standards of effectiveness. Since profit is financial in nature, it
follows that the responsibility center approach contributes to the
performance accounting objective of facilitating establishment of
performance criteria.
The dysfunctional consequences expected incident to excessive
emphasis on a single criterion of effectiveness (such as cost limitations
or profit targets) mitigate against sole reliance upon the responsibility
center concept for performance evaluation. Although multiple criteria
*Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,
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are expected to be less objective than a single measure, cost allocation,
internal transfer pricing, price level changes, and similar practical
difficulties preclude reliance upon responsibility center financial
measurements except as a rough estimate of performance.
Goal Integration
The objective of establishing goal congruence between the
individual and the organization involves integrating one set of multiple
goals with another. One viewpoint contends that conflicts among
individuals and internal organizational groups can be resolved by vertical
and horizontal participation in specifying organizational goals. Stedry's*
work indicates that the standard subject to influence is the participant's
aspiration level which may not be significantly affected by participation.
With respect to the responsibility center concept, the value of participation
appears to be based upon the resulting "fair" standard that is expected to
be negotiated through participative analysis of the various aspects of
operation and conversion of the analysis to an expected outcome in terms
of a financial aggregate.
A financial aggregate standard, although subject to dysfunctional
consequences if it is viewed as threatening to the responsible individual,
may contribute to effectiveness because it provides for adaptability to
changing needs and to a changing environment. For this reason, the
responsibility center concept, which is concerned with financial aggregates,
"•Stedry, Budget Control and Cost Behavior.
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may be an appropriate technique for integrating the goals of the individual
and the organization.
Much of the foregoing is speculative. Continued research in
this area is warranted.
Relevancy of Information
The relevancy determination with respect to the responsibility
center concept and performance evaluation remains elusive and subject to
judgment. The search for techniques that will reduce complexity and
uncertainty continues.
The responsibility center approach provides for some degree of
simplification and objectivity, but it is subject to a multitude of
controversies regarding the proper treatment of costs, revenues, and
assets. Difficulties associated with transfer pricing techniques in
artificially established profit centers or investment centers and difficulties
with arbitrary capital or asset assignments in investment centers appear
to limit the effectiveness of the responsibility center concept as a
technique to simulate small business independence within a larger
organization.
The cost center approach, although subject to arbitrariness in
allocation decisions, may be appropriate in cases where financial
standards are considered relevant to the operations involved. It appears
just as likely that the cost center concept may be inappropriate in cases
that involve considerable interdependence among organizational units.
This does not say that costs should be omitted from performance evaluation
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or from decisions. It means that a cost center should not be established
artificially in cases where costs are not, in fact, a primary consideration
in decision making. The contention is that decision makers can evaluate
cost factors entering into a decision on the basis of analysis independent
of the cost center concept. A similar rationale can be applied to profit
centers and investment centers. Artificiality in establishing the
responsibility center concept can lead to irrelevance and therefore to
inappropriate evaluations and poor decisions.
The relevancy issue reverts to the discussion pertaining to the
nature of measurement. It is important to recognize what can be
measured and what cannot be measured, what is being measured and what
is not being measured in a system used for performance evaluation.
Caution is in order to insure that a measurement developed on the basis
of one criterion is not ritualistically assumed to apply to another criterion.
Finding
No clear principle or theory has evolved as a result of this
study. It is concluded that the responsibility center concept is a potentially
useful technique to sharpen financial management effectiveness. The
danger of implementing the concept is that assumptions about relationships
may not be understood by all of the participants involved.
It is considered appropriate, therefore, to encourage continuation
of research and experimentation that will relate the science of measurement,
systems theory, cybernetics, and behavioral science research to
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